On the Volunteered Geographic Information Quality

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Overview

Web 2.0

Volunteered Geographic Information- VGI

VGI Quality

Web 2.0


Collective intelligence



Long tail



Bi-directional Web



User Generated Content



Platform




Web 2.0

GO-Globe.com



Google Search

Volunteered Geographic Information - VGI



- ★ Cost License
- ★ Extended field of scope
- ★ Local knowledge
- ★ Creation of novel datasets
- ★ Timely data




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VGI: A lot of effort




by Mark Graham (@geoplace) and Stefano De Sabbata (@maps4thought)
Internet Geographies at the Oxford Internet Institute • 2014 • geography.oii.ox.ac.uk

data sources: Openstreetmap.org Geofabrik.de

Number of edits over 500,000 50,000 - 500,000 5,001 - 50,000 501 - 5,000

Content edits to OpenStreetMap



VGI: by neo-geographers



VGI Creation Processes

- Loose, crowdsourced mechanisms
- No specifications
- No standardized production line
- No Metadata
- No formal gatekeeping / data curation
- > Patchwork
- Socio-economic mechanisms

Formal Quality
Assessment & Evaluation
Processes:

Hard, if at all possible, to implement

VGI Diffusion

- > EU COST Actions
- > EuroSDR
- World Bank
- Governments Cadastral Agencies
- > FIG
- Private Sector (Apple, Yahoo!, MapQuest, Foursquare)
- > US (Al Gore: Digital Earth, White House Report)

VGI Quality – Fundamental Problem

There is no clear understanding of VGI Quality.




YET ... Need for transactions over VGI datasets


2001 Nobel Prize in Economics:



G. A. Akerlof



M. A. Spence



J. E. Stiglitz

Markets with asymmetric information

Many markets are characterized by asymmetric information: actors on one side of the market have much better information than those on the other.

Problem realisation - documentation



"George Akerlof demonstrated how a market where sellers have more information than buyers about product quality can contract into an *adverse selection* of low-quality products."

Source: Nobelprize.org

- The buyers' awareness of their ignorance make them suspicious and force them to treat any product as being of low quality.
- > Bid down their offers for the products.
- Sellers lower the quality of their products.
- Transactions stop or low-quality products prevail.

Examples: Borrowers know more than lenders about their repayment prospects, managers and boards know more than shareholders about the firm's profitability

Solution by the better informed



"Michael Spence identified an important form of adjustment by individual market participants, where the better informed take costly actions in an attempt to improve on their market outcome by credibly transmitting information to the poorly informed."

Source: Nobelprize.org

- > The better informed should signal their information to the less informed.
- > Signals must have a cost.
- > Signaling cost should not be the same for everyone.
- Signaling cost must be negatively correlated with the quality of the product or the credibility of the better informed party.
- Can apply to distinguish permanent from one-off actors.

Examples: Education as a productivity signal in job markets

Solution by the poorly informed



"Joseph Stiglitz clarified the opposite type of market adjustment, where poorly informed agents extract information from the better informed"

Source: Nobelprize.org

- Poorly informed should create incentives for information disclosure by the better informed.
- > Incentives should put the better informed into a self-screening process.
- The better informed will reveal quality information during their effort to get the incentives.

Examples: Insurance companies dividing customers into risk classes by offering a menu of contracts where higher deductibles can be exchanged for significantly lower premiums

Back to Geomatics domain

Better informed ——— VGI Admins

Poorly Informed VGI Consumers

Product VGI datasets

Signals?

Incentives?

Signals


- VGI Specificications
- QA&QC Teams of volunteers
- Metadata
- Firm Extraction Guides and Contribution Protocols
- More than APIs: Standards-based Geo Web Services
- Long-term investments (Interactivity HCI, software etc.)


Incentives

- Different level of premiums
 - Financial support
 - Hardware
 - Online help
 - Mentoring
 - > Consulting
- Participation statistics
- Quality benchmarks

What is next?











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
OSM: Completeness and Positional Accuracy



OSM: Positional Accuracy








Participation Patterns for geo-tagged photos

Flickr in 3D



Participation Patterns in OSM



Hot-spot Analysis on the number of edits for each feature

On the Volunteered Geographic Information Quality

Thank you!